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ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
MORTGAGORS OF THE HOME OWNERS' LOAN
CORPORATION AND THIRD PARTIES
Rxic D F. PAYNrE"
The Home Owners' Loan Corporation, for brevity referred to
herein as the HOLC, was organized and exists under the laws of
the United States, Home Owners' Loan Act, hereinafter referred
to as the act. This act was passed for the purpose of providing
emergency relief with respect to mortgage and other form of lien
indebtedness against homes.'
The passage and administration of this act has resulted in con-
siderable litigation. The problem with which this article proposes
to deal concerns the situation wherein the holder of the lien claim
against the home owner contracted with the HOLC to accept its
bonds in full settlement of the lien claim and to release the claim
in full against the property of the home owner. However, at some
stage during the proceedings of the granting of the loan by the
HOLC to the home owner, some of the lien holders exacted from
the home owner a collateral agreement that an additional sum
would be paid to the lien holder by the home owner. The making
of some types of these collateral agreements was expressly for-
bidden by certain provisions of the act,2 and the making of other
types was forbidden by the rules and regulations of the HOLC "
which were provided for by other provisions of the act.4 In many
instances the home owner did not comply with the duty imposed
by the collateral agreement and the lien holder resorted to the
courts to enforce the rights given to him by it.5 In other cases the
home owner instituted proceedings in the courts to relieve him from
the duty imposed by the collateral agreement.'
Litigation concerning this problem has reached the appellate
courts in nine states, and in eight of these states there have been
decisions refusing to enforce the provisions of the collateral agree-
* Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law.
1 48 STAT. 128 (1933) and amendments, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1461 et seq.
(1936). "AN ACT To provide emergency relief with respect to home mort-
gage indebtedness, to refinance home mortgages, to extend relief to owners of
homes occupied by them who are unable to amortize their debt elsewhere."
2 Id. at § 1467 (e).
3 Manual of Rules and Regulations c. 6, § 4-d (1).
4 12 U. S. C. A. § 1463(k) (1936).
5 Jessewich v. Abbene, 154 Misc. 768, 277 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1935).
6 Anderson v. Horst, 200 Atl. 721 (Pa, Super. 1938).
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ment.7 However, in two of these eight states, and in one other state,
there also have been decisions upholding them.8 In one of these
two states the decision was based on the ground that there was no
fraud in the making of the collateral agreement and that a repre-
sentative of the HOLC had knowledge of it.' The court did not
determine the authority of this representative of the HOLC. The
other decision enforcing the collateral agreement was determined
largely on the fact that there was disclosure to the HOLC at the
time the lien holder made the offer to the HOLC that the collateral
agreement had been made.1" The only state that has squarely up-
held such collateral agreement based its decision on the ground that
"the note was not discharged by the release and the agreement was
not void as against public policy.""
The courts have refused to give legal sanctity to these col-
lateral agreements mainly on the ground of public policy. 2 Very
little attempt has been made by the courts to analyze the con-
tractual relationship of the parties, and to determine the bearing
of it on the conclusion to be reached. Undoubtedly public policy
has a bearing on all of these cases, but it seems that the contractual
relationship of the parties should be analyzed carefully in order to
determine what bearing it has on the problem.
The public policy that the courts have deemed applicable in
these cases seems to have been summarized by Justice Strahl in
Jessewic7h v. Abbene :'I'
"This agreement is illegal and void, being made in viola-
tion of a statute, and plaintiffs cannot recover thereunder....
7 Jessewich v. Abbene, 154 Misc. 768, 277 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1935); First
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Speaker, 159 Misc. 427, 287 N. Y. Supp. 831(1936); Chaves County B. & L. Ass'n v. Hodges, 40 N. M. 326, 59 P. (2d)
671 (1936); Stager v. Junker, 14 N. .1. Misc. 913, 188 Atl. 440 (1936);
Cook v. Donner, 145 Kan. 674, 66 P. (2d) 587 (1937); Pye v. Grunert, 201
Minn. 191, 275 N. W. 615 (1937); Meek v. Wilson, 283 Mich. 679, 278
N. W. 731 (1938); Anderson v. Horst, 200 At. 721 (Pa. Super. 1938);
Heath v. Huffman, Tenn. App., April 1, 1939; R. L. Hays v. Commerce
Union Bank, not reported (decided by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee,
Middle Section at Nashville). Contra: McAllister v. Drapean, 85 P. (2d) 523(Cal. 1938).
s Ridge Inv. Corp. v. Nicolosi, 15 N. J. Misc. 569, 193 At. 710 (1937);
Bay City Bank v. White, 283 Mich. 267, 277 N. W. 888 (1938); McAllister v.
Drapeau, 85 P. (2d) 523 (Cal. 1938).
9 Ridge Inv. Corp. v. Nicolosi, 15 N. J. Misc. 569, 193 Atl. 710 (1937).
10 Bay City Bank v. White, 283 Mich. 267, 277 . W. 888 (1938).
1" Comment and criticism (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 842.
12 See cases cited supra n. 7.
13 154 Misc. 768, 277 N. Y. Sapp. 599, 600 (1935).
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"The court takes judicial notice of, and the parties here-
to are bound by, this provision and the fact that the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation, owned by the people of the United
States, is strictly a relief agency to save homes from threatened
or pending foreclosures, to save lifetime savings investments of
home owners in distress, to save them from becoming paupers,
and is the rehabilitating agency to guard and protect the small
home owner by judiciously refinancing his obligations with
enough to pay all the encumbrances on his home, but limiting
the new mortgage to 80 per cent. of its appraisal value for the
property, so he can meet his amortized mortgage by monthly
payments on principal with interest....
"Collusive agreement between creditor and home owner
creating on the owner occupied home encumbrances too heavy
and terms too severe for the home owner to work out his prob-
lem would easily defeat the very purpose of this act, interfere
by trickery with this corporation collecting its bonds, and the
government's financial assistance would merely delay the in-
evitable foreclosure suit which it meant to prevent. The second
mortgagee would thereby benefit by his own wrong, first, in be-
ing paid by the government the greater part of his second
mortgage in tax exempt bonds which it guarantees uncon-
ditionally14 both as to principal and interest; then by getting
the defendant's homestead through foreclosure for the small
balance due; and, lastly, by getting the benefit of the excellent
first mortgage thereon, never intended for him.
"This contract calls for an act by the defendant owners
which the law for their own good forbade. The United States
can make its prohibitions binding to the extent necessary
effectively to carry out its policies .... It is against the policy
of the law to enable either party in controversies between
themselves to enforce an agreement in fraud of the law."
Since the economic disturbance in the United States wa.s
principally the cause of the inability of the home owner to keep up
his lien payments on his home, brief mention of this situation seems
necessary.
At the time of the creation of the act, the United States was
subject to a great economic disturbance, which resulted in a large
number of people being unemployed, or in being employed at great-
ly reduced incomes.' 5 Since a large number of the homes of the
14 " The bonds were guaranteed by the United States, and any loss sustained
by the Corporation would be the loss of the United States which would have
to be made up by general taxation." Keller, J., in Anderson v. Horst, 200
Atl. 721, 722 (Pa. Super. 1938).
15 See Wickens, Adjusting the Mortgagors' Obligation to ERonmio GyCee8(1938) 5 L.iiw & CONTEMP, P9O, 617,
3
Payne: Enforceability of Agreements between Mortgagors of the Home Owner
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1939
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
country are subject to a mortgage or other form of lien indebted-
ness, the economic disturbance resulted in widespread inability of
the home owner to meet the mortgage payments as the same became
due, and this brought about a decided increase in mortgage fore-
closure, or threat of foreclosure.1
Another result of the economic situation which concerned the
home owner, was the decrease in the value of real estate. A vast
portion of the mortgage indebtedness was created when the real
estate had a high appraisal value and when money was cheap. In
many instances the property had been overvalued for loan pur-
poses, and this especially was true with respect to second or other
junior mortgages. As the depression became more severe, the dif-
ference between the value of the property and the amount of the
lien indebtedness against it became less and less, and in a great
many instances the amount of the lien indebtedness became greater
than the value of the property. Thus, many home owners were
not only subject to the loss of their home property, but also they
were subject to a deficiency decree. All of this caused great dis-
tress to thousands of people who were trying to secure a home of
their own, causing many to despair of being able to do so.
The federal government attempted to relieve this condition by
the passage of the act. The act autliorized and directed the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, hereinafter called the board, to create
and to administer the Home Owners' Loan Corporation.17 The
board was authorized to make such by-laws, rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with the provisions of the act, as was necessary for
the proper conduct of the affairs of the HOLC.'5 The act also
authorized the board to make rules for the appraisal of the property
on which loans were made under it, so as to accomplish its pur-
pose. "'9 Acting under such authority the board proceeded to make
such rules as were needed to carry on the business of the HOLC.
These rules were incorporated in the "Manual of Rules and Regu-
lations of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation."-
20
16 See Wallace, Survey of Federal Legislation Affecting Private Home
Financing (1938) 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 481, 489.
a712 U. S. C. A. § 1463(a) (1936).
181d. at § 1463(k).
191d. at § 1463(h).
2ONote: The board passed many resolutions and distributed these resolu-
tions to the field offices in the form of bulletins. All of these resolutions were
consolidated in the "Manual of Rules and Regulations of the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation". This manual was sent to the field offices on October
10 1934, and remained in force and effect during the loan closing operations.
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The refunding provisions of many mortgages were unsuited
to the financial status of the mortgagor. For instance, many
mortgages required the repayment of the loan in too short a
period; others called for a large lump payment to be made at the
expiration of the mortgage; others called for a small payment the
first month and the payment increased each month thereafter until
at the end of the mortgage period they were beyond the ability of
the home owner to meet them; and others were the reverse of the
latter situation. These and other evils of mortgage refunding were
recognized 2'1 and in order to alleviate them, the act provided that
the loans of the HOLC were to be amortized over a period not to
exceed fifteen years.22 The payments were $7.91 per month per
$1,000 of the face of the loan. This guarded the home owner
against the evils of refinancing the mortgage with the added costs
of the same, and it made the payments the same each month
throughout the duration of the loan, and thus the home owner
would be in a better situation to meet them.
The act provided that the property of the home owner was to
be appraised by designated officials of the HOLC, but it limited
the new mortgage to 80 per cent. of the appraised value of the
property.23 The purpose of this provision of the act was to better
enable the home owner to meet the monthly payment.
24
After the home owner applied to the HOLC for a loan, before
the HOLC could proceed with the proper steps in the making of
the loan, the lien holder had to give to the HOLC a "Mortgagee's
Consent to Take Bonds," hereafter referred to as bond consent.
If the lien holder would not accept the bonds of the HOLC in
settlement of the home owner's obligation to him, it was useless for
the HOLC to proceed further with the loan. The lien holder was
under no duty to give this bond consent, but he was privileged to
do S0.21
Owing to the situation of the lien holder in reference to the
property of the home owner, most bond consents were readily
given.26  If the HOLC granted the loan to the home owner, the
21 See Wallace, supra n. 15.
2212 U. S. C. A. § 1463(d) (1936).
23 Ibid.
24 See Wallace, supra n. 15, at 482.
2 Thorne v. Edwards, 147 Ore. 443, 34 P. (2d) 640, 645 (1934).
26 Often the situation of the mortgagee or other lien holder was no less
deplorable than that of the mortgagor. The failure of the home owner to
meet the lien payments, and the decrease in the value of the property jeopard-
ized the investment of the mortgagee. Even though the mortgagee ex~reised
5
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debt would be liquidated with bonds of the HOLC. These bonds
could be converted into cash. Even though the amount of cash
received might be less than the amount of the lien indebtedness,
yet the dollar the lien holder obtained from the sale of the bonds
had a greater purchasing power than the dollar he loaned. Thus,
the lien holder in a great many instances was directly benefited
by the act. In fact many home owners applied to the HOLC for
a loan at the suggestion of the lien holder.2 7
The bond consent which the lien holder was privileged to fill
out, sign and deliver to the HOLC,2-5 set forth the total amount of
the lien indebtedness which the lien holder had against the property
of the home owner, and the amount of EIOLC bonds, face value,
that would be accepted in full settlement of this claim. If the
refunding of the obligation could be consummated on the part of
the HOLC, the lien holder consented to accept these bonds in full
settlement of the lien claim and to release all the claim held
against the property of the home owner. The bond consent that
was used after January 31, 1935, at which time the larger portion of
the lending had been consummated, contained the following pro-
vision:
"The undersigned represents that he will not require of the
applicant any second mortgage or other instrument evidencing
any portion of the aforesaid obligation or the payment of any
money or other additional consideration except only as follows
the power of foreclosure, in most cases there were no purchasers for the
property and the mortgagee had to purchase it in order to be protected. When
a deficiency decree had to be taken by the mortgagee, it was frequenty of little
value, as in many cases the mortgagor had no other property of any value.
Further, in all states foreclosure is expensive, and in some jurisdictions its
cost is excessive. When the value of the property was less than the lien in-
debtedness and the home owner had no other property, the cost of foreclosure
only increased the amount the mortgagee had in the property. The mortgagee
often found himself the owner of real estate which was taken originally as
security for a loan. Also, due to the conditions of the times, a large part of
this property could not be rented profitably. Regardless of such financial
distress, taxes continued to come due and had to be paid. However, it must
be remembered the purpose of the act was to help the home owner and not
his mortgagee. See Bridewell, Effects of Defective Mortgage Laws on Home
Financing, 1930-1937 (1938) 5 LAw & CONTE P. PROB. 545.
27 Pye v. Grunert, 201 Alinn. 191, 275 N. W. 615 (1937) ; Bay City Bank v.
White, 283 Mich. 267, 277 N. W. 888 (1938).
28 (a) First bond consent used.
Form No. 2
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The Manual of Rules and Regulations contained a similar provi-
sion.20  The lien holder acknowledged that the HOLO would incur
trouble and expense in connection with its effort to refund the
indebtedness of the home owner, and in consideration of the same,
agreed that the bond consent would be binding for a stated time.0
The bond consent contained a provision that the lien holder
"consents, if said refunding can be consummated, to accept in full
settlement" of his claim the bonds of the HOLC and to release all
of his claim against the property of the home owner."' The word
"consent" considered in connection with the phrase that follows it,
MORTGAGEE'S CONSENT TO TAKE BONDS
To HOME OWNERS' LOAN CORPORATION:
The undersigned is the holder of a first mortgage or other obligation, which
constitutes a lien or claim on the title to the home property of ...............................
located at ..................................................................................................... 
.
(Number) (Street) (City) (State)
in the sum of $ ...................................
Being informed that said owner has made application to Home Owners'
Loan Corporation to refund his said indebtedness, the undersigned has con-
sidered the method of refunding mortgages provided in Home Owners' Loan
Act of 1933, as passed by Congress and approved by the President, and the
undersigned hereby consents, if said refunding can be consummated, to accept
in full settlement of the claim of the undersigned the sum of $ .........................
face value of the bonds of Home Owners' Loan Corporation, to be adjusted
with not exceeding $50 cash as provided in said act, and thereupon to release
all the claims of the undersigned against said property.
It is understood that you will incur trouble and expense in connection with
your effort to refund the indebtedness of said home owner, and this consent is
executed in consideration of the same and shall be binding for a period
of ............................ days from date.
This, the ................................ day of ................................, 193
(Signature)
Approved June 20, 1933.
(b) The second bond consent used was the same as (a) except it contained
these additional words in the option clause: "and thereafter until 10 days
written notice shall have been given the State manager of the Corporation."
Approved August 29, 1933.
(c) Same as (b) except it contained additional blanks for information con-
cerning the lien indebtedness.
Approved June 12, 1934.
(d) Same as (e) except the instrument was under seal and contained the
following additional words before the option clause: "The undersigned repre-
sents that he will not require of the applicant any second mortgage or other
instrument evidencing any portion of the aforesaid obligation or the payment
of any money or other additional consideration except only as follows ....... Y7
Approved January 31, 1935.
29 See Manual of Rules and Regulations c. 6, § 4-d(1).
so See Mortgagee's Consent to Take Bonds, supra n. 27.
s1. Tb.
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shows that the lien holder intended to induce action on the part
of the HOLC, namely, that the HOLC would attempt to refund
the obligation of the home owner. Then, if the obligation could
be refunded, bonds of the HOLC would be accepted in full settle-
ment of the claim and a release in full would be given. The lien
holder was using the word "consent" in the sense of promising.
Since the requirements of a legally sufficient promise involves an
undertaking that something shall be done or happen or shall not
be done or happen in the future,32 and since a promise, if intended,
is an offer,33 therefore, the lien holder was using the word "consent"
intending to make an offer to the HOLC. At the time the consent
was given the HOLO, whether or not the obligation of the appli-
cant could be refunded was not known, and could not be known
until the officials of the HOLC went through the proper procedure
to determine whether or not the application fell within the pre-
scribed limits of the corporation as to the granting of loans to
home owners. Considering this fact, the bond consent properly
cannot be construed as an acceptance of an offer made by the
HOLC.-3 4 Aso, the bond consent did not ask for a return promise
on the part of the HOLC, as at that time legally none could be
given.3r The offer of the lien holder was a promise, that, if the
HOLC, after considering the application and finding that it came
within the prescribed limits of the corporation as to the granting
of loans to home owners, gave its bonds in full settlement of such
obligation, then the lien holder would accept them in full settle-
ment of the claim and give a release in full to the home owner.
The offer of the lien holder called for an act on the part of the
HOLC. A promise that calls for an act in the acceptance of it,
calls for the creation of a one-sided contract. This type of con-
tract is called a unilateral contract. "A unilateral contract is one
in which no promisor received a promise as consideration for his
promise." 3"
In order to have a binding contract in law it is necessary that
"legally sufficient consideration be given for the promise or
promises therein."'37 The lien holder, in giving the executed bond
321 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (REv. ed. 1936) § 24A; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) § 24.
331 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 26; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 25..
34 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 27; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 25-26.
35 See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 13; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 12.
38 Ibid.
371 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 99.
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consent to the HOLC desired in return that the HOLC would grant
the application of the home owner and refund the lien indebted-
ness to him by giving its bonds. When done, this fulfilled the
requisite of consideration in contracts. Ordinarily consideration
is considered sufficient if there is a detriment incurred by the
promisee, or a benefit received by the promisor at the request of
the promisor. The lien holder gave his promise to the HOLC
to accept its bonds and to give a full release of his claim against
the property of the home owner in return for the act of the HOLC
in giving him its bonds. This meets the requirements of considera-
tion as defined by the American Law Institute: "Consideration
for a promise is an act other than a promise .... bargained for
and given in exchange for a promise. "3
The lien holder promised the HOLC not to revoke the offer for
a stated time."' The promisor expected the HOLC to incur trouble
and expense in its attempt to refund the indebtedness of the home
owner, and promised to give the offeree the stated time in order
that it might determine if the application came within the pre-
scribed limits as to the granting of loans. This promise was in-
tended to induce action, and when it did induce action on the
part of the HOLC, it became a binding option.40 After the HOLW
did some act in attempting to make the loan, the lien holder was
under a duty and the HOLC had a right that it have the stated
time to fully determine if it could grant the loan. 41 Therefore,
38 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75. See I WiLsToN, CONTRACTS § 102.
39 See Mortgagee's Consent to Take Bonds, supra n. 27.
40 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 61; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 24,
45, 46, 47.
41 An analysis of the legal relations of the parties shows that the home
owner was privileged to make application to the HOLC for a loan. The HOLO
was under no duty to attempt the refunding of the obligation until the bond
consent was given by the lien holder. The lien holder was privileged to give
the bond consent but was under no duty to do so. When the HOLC received
the bond consent, by reason of the statutes it was under a duty to the home
owner to attempt the refunding and the home owner had a right to compel
the HOLC to attempt to do so. Th9 HOLC owed no duty to the lien holder
to attempt the refunding. After the HOLO did an act in attempting to refund
the obligation, then it had the right to have the stated time in the option clause
to determine if the refunding could be made, and the lien holder was under
a duty that the HOLC have this stated time. Within the stated or a reasonable
time, the HOLC had the power to accept the offer of the len holder by tender-
ing him its bonds, and during this time the len holder was under a liability
that the HOLC might do so. If the HOLC tendered to the flen holder its
bonds, he was under a duty to accept them and to give to the home owner a
full release. The lien holder was under a duty to the HOLO not to exact from
the home owner any agreement requiring the home owner to pay the lien
holder any further sum evidencing any part of the old obligation. The lien
holder had the power of extinguishing the right of the HOLC to compel him
9
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since the promise of the lien holder was the subject matter of the
bargain between the parties and the promisee suffered a detriment
by such action, there is sufficient consideration for this option
according to the orthodox common-law definition or as defined
by the American Law Institute.42
In many instances the appraised value of the property of the
home owner was not sufficient to permit the HOLC to pay all the
lien indebtedness against it, but the lien holder accepted the amount
that would be advanced and gave a full release. "The payment
of a smaller sum in satisfaction of a larger is not a good discharge
of a debt,"4 3 is a rule of law in most states. The reason for this
rule is that the debtor is only doing what he is bound to do and
so suffers no legal detriment, and that the creditor in receiving
the money obtains no legal benefit.4 4 Therefore, in order that the
agreement be binding, there needs to be other consideration. Here
such consideration is found (1) in the payment made by a third
party with an understanding by the parties that it should be in
full satisfaction of the obligation of the home owner, and (2) in
a medium of payment different from that for which bound, namely,
bonds of the HOLC. This brings the operative facts of the case
within two of the recognized exceptions of the above stated rule,
and hence there was good accord and satisfaction of the lien claim.45
The unilateral contract that was made between the lien holder
and the HOLC created certain rights in favor of the home owner.
When the HOLC gave its bonds to the lien holder, the lien holder
was under a duty to the HOLC to give to the home owner a full
release. Also, the lien holder was under a duty to the HOLC not
to make any collateral agreement with the home owner regarding
any part of the old obligation that remained unpaid. This duty
resulted from the act itself and from the rules and regulations
created thereunder, which forbade the lien holder from requiring
of the home owner any agreement holding the home owner for
the payment of any part of the old obligation or other additional
to take its bonds by accepting them and giving the release and not exacting
any further agreement from the home owner, thus terminating the legal rela-
tions of the parties. See Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology (1920)
29 YALE L. J. 163.
42See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 112, 139, 140; ANSON, CONTRACTS
(Corbin's ed. 1930) § 126; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90.
43 ANs N, CONTRACTS § 140.
441 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 120.
41 See ANSON, CONTRACTS 148, n. 3; 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS §§ 121, 125;
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 421; Jes.ewich v. Abbene, 154 Misc. 768, 277
N. Y. Supp. 599 (1935).
10
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consideration, unless the HOLC gave its consent to such agree-
ment.4 6 The bond consent used during the latter part of the lend-
ing period contained a similar provision.4" The contract between
the lien holder and the HOLC was made for the benefit of both
the home owner and the HOLC, in that the HOLC attempted to
refinance the property of the home owner on a basis of his ability
to meet the monthly payments as they came due, thereby giving
more assurance to the HOLC that it would receive its advances.
The lien holder by his course of dealing with the HOLC, led the
HOLC to believe that no, collateral agreement was being exacted
from the home owner by him. If the lien holder were allowed to
add extra payments to the home owner, without regard to his ability
to pay, these extra payments might cause the home owner to de-
fault in his payments to the HOLC.4  Under these facts the home
owner was donee beneficiary of the contract between the lien holder
and the HOLC. He was entitled to a full release of the claim of
the lien holder and legally no collateral agreement could be ex-
acted from him. The rights of third party beneficiaries are recog-
nized in most jurisdictions, 9 and in these states the home owner
could enforce this contract made for the benefit of himself as well
as for the benefit of the HOC. This three-cornered transaction
has been termed a novation50
The home owner, having received new rights by virtue of the
contract between the lien holder and the HOLC, proceeded to
renounce these rights by the making of the collateral agreement.
Under the circumstances of the case, have these renounced rights
been lost? It seems they have not been lost, in view of the fact that
the act and the rules and regulations made thereunder forbade
the making of any agreement renouncing these rights.
The collateral agreement was not made under duress, as the
term is usually defined,"l but the parties were not on a parity with
each other so as to be in pari deliCto.5 2 The lien holder had started
or was threatening to start foreclosure proceedings. The home
owner had to agree to the making of the collateral agreement, other-
wise he would lose his home through these foreclosure proceedings.
4612 U. S. C. A. § 1467 (e) (k) (1936). See Manual of Rules and Regu-
lations c. 6, § 4-d(1).
47 See Mortgagee's Consent to, Take Bonds, supra n. 27 (d).
48 See Anderson v. Horst, 200 Atl. 721, 723 (Pa. Super. 1938).
49 See ANSON, CONTRACTS § 284; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 356.
so See Anderson v. Horst, 200 AUt. 721, 722 (Pa. Super. 1938).
51 See 'Duress", 3 WDs. & Pim. (3d Ser. 1928) 88.
52 Smeltzer v. MeCrory, 101 S. W. (2d) 850, 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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The HOLC could not complete the loan to the home owner unless
it received the cooperation of the lien holder. Under these cir-
cumstances there was such economic compulsion exerted on the
part of the lien holder as to relieve the home owner of the charge
of being in pari delicto as to the making of this forbidden collateral
agreement. In effect this was a form of undue influence. Parol
evidence is admissible to show that the validity of the collateral
agreement was impaired by such undue influence.' 3 When the home
owner is seeking affirmative relief, asking to have his notes sur-
rendered and canceled and the device securing them removed
from the records, or seeking to recover money paid under this void
agreement, then the question of whether or not the home owner
was in pari delicto with the lien holder in the making of this col-
lateral agreement becomes important. Relief has been denied as to
the recovery of money paid under such collateral agreement, though
in the same case the court granted affirmative relief as to the set-
ting aside of the illegal agreement.5 4 There is a contra holding
though as to the recovery of money paid under such an agree-
ment.15 Even though the collateral agreement was illegal, since
the making of it was forbidden by a United States statute, refusal
to allow the home owner to recover money paid under it might
jeopardize the chances of the HOL of receiving its payments.
Public policy demands that recovery be allowed the home owner."
In view of the preceding facts, it seems that by the better reason-
ing the recovery of this money should be had. The question of
pari deicto is not important when the home owner is the defendant,
since he can set up as a defense to the suit on the contract its
illegality.
Even though in some jurisdictions the promisee of the con-
tract between the lien holder and the HOL could sue at law, yet
this is not an adequate remedy, since the measure of damages
would be bard to ascertain. Further, regardless of the fact that
under this contract the HOL retained certain beneficial rights,
the HOL in some states could enforce this promise in equity,57
since there the rule is that the promisee of a contract made for the
benefit of a third party can enforce the promise against the
53 See 3 W sILIsToN, CONTRACTS § 634.
5 See Anderson v. Horst, 200 At]. 721 (Pa. Super. 1938).
-, See Meek v. Wilson, 283 Mich. 679, 278 N. W. 731 (1938).
r6 See Heath v. Hoffnan, R. L. Hays v. Commerce Union Bank, both supra
n. 7.
5 See Croker v. New York Trust Co., 245 N..Y. 17, 156 N. E. 81 (1927).
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promisor in a suit in equity, even though the promisee has retained
no pecuniary benefits. Since the HOLC also retained pecuniary
benefits under this contract, suit should be allowed in all equity
courts.
The promisee and the beneficiary both have an interest in the
performance of the promisor. Therefore, the home owner can bring
a suit in equity for the specific performance of the contract made
by the lien holder and the HOLW. The HOLC should be joined
as a co-defendant with the promisor. "In this way all the parties
have a chance to be heard. There may always be a possible ques-
tion as to the respective rights of the promisee and the beneficiary,
and also whether the promisor had a valid defense against the
promisee, and these questions should not be determined in any liti-
gation in which all three interested parties are not joined. Any
procedure which not only permits but requires this meets the neces-
sities of the case.'"'" Since the courts so far have not recognized
the desirability of enforcing the rights of beneficiaries in equity
or corresponding proceedings under codes, in which all are made
parties to the suit other equitable grounds must be present.Y There
are present here such other equitable grounds, namely, the home
owner is entitled to have the collateral agreement, which usually
in part consists of a negotiable instrument, surrendered and can-
celed and removed from record, if recorded. Further, if a suit
by the lien holder against the home owner were pending at law,
the home owner would be entitled to an injunction against the
further prosecution of this suit, since equity could enforce the
implied negative covenant of the lien holder not to make a col-
lateral agreement with the home owner. In addition, if the claim
founded on this illegal contract has been reduced to judgment in
an action at law, this judgment can be set aside by a court of
equity.60
Many of the lien holders were willing to sign the bond consent
and to obtain from the HOLC all that would be advanced against
the property of the home owner, but at some time during the pro-
ceedings exacted from the home owner a collateral agreement that
58 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 359.
59 Ibid.
60 See John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dick, 114 Mich. 337, 72
N. W. 179 (1897); Moeckly v. Gorton, 78 Iowa 202, 42 N. W. 648 (1889) ;
Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Blackshear Bank, 182 Ga. 657, 186 S. E.
724 (1936); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Koslofsky, 67 N. D. 322, 271
N. W. 907 (1937); Anderson v. Horst, Heath v. Hoffman, R. L. Hays v. Com-
merce Union Bank, all supra n. 7.
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an additional sum would be paid to the lien holder by the home
owner. This additional sum might be for all or part of the dif-
ference between the face value of the bonds of the HOLC and their
market value on the date of issue to the lien holder,6 ' or such ad-
ditional sum might be for all or part of the difference between the
amount received from the HOLC and the amount of the lien in-
debtedness against the property of the home owner.2
The form of these collateral agreements varied. Some were
merely in the form of an unsecured note ;6 others were in the form
of a second mortgage on the home being refinanced ;604 and still
others were in the form of a mortgage on -other property of the
home owner.6 5 The latter even might be a chattel mortgage on the
household goods of the home owner.6
In regard to the -disclosure to the HOLC of these collateral
agreements, the following type situations resulted or might have
resulted: (1) disclosure on the bond consent; (2) disclosure to
officials of the HOLC who had authority to act on the matter;
(3) disclosure in the form of a written document in the HOLC
file of the home owner ;67 (4) disclosure to employees of the HOLC
who did not have authority to pass upon the matter; (5) dis-
closure to the fee attorney (closing attorney) of the HOLC ;68 (6)
no disclosure in any form to the HOLC.
The collateral agreement whereby the home owner agreed to
pay the lien holder the difference between the face value of the
bonds and their market value on the date of issue is void under
the provisions of the act. The act prohibited such an agreement
and fixed a heavy penalty for its violation.69 The law sought to
prevent this type of contract. The lien holder technically was not
a party to the loan contract, but he was bound by its provisions.7 0
61 See Pye v. Grunert, Stager v. Junker, both supra n. 7.
62 First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Utica v. Speaker, Cook v. Donner,
Anderson v. Horst, Heath v. Huffman, R. L. Hays v. Commerce Union Bank,
all supra a. 7; Bay City Bank v. White, Ridge Inv. Corp. v. Nicolosi, both supra
n. 8. ' .1S
63 Jessewich v. Abbene, First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Utica v. Speaker,
both supra n. 7; Ridge TIv. Corp. v. Nicolosi, 15 N. J. Mise. 569, 193 At.
710 (1937).
64 See Cook v. Donner, Meek v. Wilson, Anderson v. Horst, Heath v. Hoffman,
R. L. Hays v. Commerce Union Bank, all supra n. 7.
6. See Bay City Bank v. White, 283 Much. 267, 277 N. W. 888 (1938).
66 See Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Koslofsky, 67 N. D. 322, 271
N. W. 907 (1937).
07 See Bay City Bank v. White, 283 Mich. 267, 277 N. W. 888 (1938).
68 See Ridge Inv. Corp. v. Nicolosi, 15 N. J. Misc. 569, 193 AtI. 710 (1937).
6912 U. S. C. A. § 1467 (e) (1936).
70 See Pye v. Grunert, 201 Minn. 191, 275 N. W. 615 (1937).
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"The policy announced by the home owners loan act is a policy
of the United States by which we are bound, and there can be no
question but that the United States can make its prohibition bind-
ing upon others than the technical parties to the loan contract in
order to protect the borrowers."'
The board passed regulations regarding cases where the full
amount of the lien indebtedness against the property of the home
owner could not be refunded. The HOLC was authorized to per-
mit the lien holder, in cases where the officials empowered to act
upon the matter 72 thought the second mortgage desirable, to take
a second mortgage on the property of the home -owner. The amount
of the second mortgage could not exceed the difference between
the HOLO's appraisal and the amount of its first mortgage.73 The
taking of such second mortgage by the lien holder was not a matter
of right, but one of privilege granted by the HOLC. 74 In no event
was the second mortgage to be in terms which would cause the
payments of the home owner to be a hardship or deprive him of a
reasonable opportunity to meet them when due."
The making of the collateral agreement when the same was
disclosed to the HOLC by being noted on the bond consent presents
no difficulties. The proper officials of the HOLC had to pass upon
the matter before the loan could be granted. Of course if they
ruled in favor of allowing the second mortgage within the pre-
scribed bounds, no objection can be made by anyone. In the event
the officials did not pass upon the matter before the loan was made,
or passed upon it adversely but did not so notify the lien holder,
this would prevent any defense on the grounds of the illegality of
the collateral agreement. When the HOLC gave its bonds to thc
lien holder, it implied that it accepted the offer as made. "The
offeror should not be obliged to speculate whether the offeree assents
to the proposed terms." 6
Where the making of the collateral agreement was disclosed to
an official of the HOLC who had power to pass upon the matter
but did not do so, at first glance it would appear that the type of
71Id. at 193.
72 Manual of Rules and Regulations c. 3, § 12, a, b, d, c. This created the
Adjustment Section, giving authority to adjust claims of mortgagees, and to
bind the HOLC by giving permission to the mortgagee to take a second mort-
gage or unsecured note.
73 Manual of Rules and Regulations c. 6, § 4d(2).
74 See Pye -. Grunert, 201 Minn. 191, 275 N. W. 615 (1937).
7 See Jessewich v. Abbene, 154 Misc. 768, 277 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1935).
761 WILLISToN, CONTRACTS § 71. See RESTATzmRNT, CONTRACTS § 58.
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"estoppel" as discussed in the preceding paragraph should apply.
Since an offer can be varied before acceptance, and, since the bond
consent was merely an offer, it would appear that the offer could
be varied at will by the offeror. However, the bond consent also
gave the IHOLC a definite time to perform the act of acceptance.
After the HOLC had done an act in its attempt to refund the obli-
gation, there was consideration for this promise, and thereafter
the offeror was not privileged to withdraw his offer during the
period of this binding option. It follows that where the offer could
not be withdrawn, it could not be changed. 7 The evidence of the
taking of the collateral agreement should not be admitted because
the binding option was in effect.7s If, at the time the disclosure
was made, the binding option had expired, then the notice to the
HOLC of the collateral agreement was in effect a new offer from
the lien holder. Since the first offer apparently had lapsed, the
offeror was privileged to make a new offer. Then, if the ROLC
accepted this offer, it would have to accept it with the collateral
agreement as a part of it79
In cases where the disclosure of the collateral agreement was
made to the HOLC by a document which was placed or should
have been placed in the HOLC file of the applicant home owner,
there again the problem of the binding option is encountered. If
the document was given to the HOLC after the bond consent and
after the HOLC had done an act in attempting the refund, the
binding option would prevent it from making any change in the
legal relations of the parties. In case the option had expired, then
the offeror was in effect making a new offer, such being a renewal
of the former offer with the collateral agreement as an addition
to it. Before the loan could be granted to the home owner, the
officials who had to approve it, were under a duty to examine all
papers in the file. If the file was not properly examined, or, if
properly examined but no disposition was made of this notice, then
when the HOLC approved the loan and gave its bonds to the
offeror, it was in effect approving the collateral agreement. The
HOLC would be "estopped" to say that it had accepted part of the
offer and rejected part of it, without giving notice of such rejection
to the offeror 8 0 The effect of this notice of part rejection would
77 AwsoN, CONTRACTS 55, n. 2.
78 See 3 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 634.
79 1 id. § 72.
so Ibid.
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be a counter offer on the part of the HOLC.s1 A similar problem
was before the supreme court of iMfichigan. The court enforced
the collateral agreement. The decision was based, in part, on
the ground of public policy. In this case the document giving
notice of the collateral agreement was given to the HOLC at the
same time that the bond consent was given.8 2  It seems that the
decision could have been based on contract law.
In cases where the disclosure was made to the employees of
the HOLC who were not empowered to act on the matter, whether
or not the binding option had expired, there is little doubt but
this notice would be ineffective and the collateral agreement would
be unenforceable. Disclosure to an agent with limited authority
of any information is not attributable to the principal, where the
limited authority does not extend to the matter disclosed.8 3 The
same conclusion would result where the disclosure was made to the
fee attorney after the loan was closed. This disclosure would be
of no effect as to the changing of the legal relations of the parties,
since the contract between the lien holder and the HOLC at that
time had been consummated.
In many instances the fee attorney drew the papers for the
collateral agreement, and often such papers were drawn before or
at the time of the closing of the loan and the giving of the bonds
of the HOLC to the lien holder.84 This or any other disclosure to
the fee attorny at such time raises a problem as to the status of
the fee attorney to the HOL. Of course if the binding option
had not expired, the disclosure would be of no effect. If it had
expired, then this status of the fee attorney must be determined.
In the first place it must be noted that the fee attorney as the
811 id. § 77; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 60.
82 See Bay City Bank v. White, 283 Mich. 267, 277 N. W. 888 (1938).
The decision of the court was on the following grounds: (1) really a sale of
the property by the lien holder to the home owner; (2) the transaction did
not minimize the security taken by the HOLC; (3) the taking of the collateral
agreement was fully disclosed to the HOLC at the time the bond consent was
given, and later a letter was written to the HOLC reiterating the details of
the collateral agreement. The third reason seems to be sound, but why not say
this was part of the offer to the HOLC? Query as to the second reason.
83See HUTFOUT, AGENCY (2d ed. 1901) § 145; MECIiEm, AGENCY (3d ed.
1923) § 488; Trentor v. Pothen, 46 Minn. 298, 49 N. W. 129 (1891).
84 See Ridge Inv. Corp. v. Nicolosi, 15 N. J. Misc. 569, 193 Atl. 710 (1937).
In this ease it was held that the home owner was bound because the collateral
agreement was prepared in the office of the closing attorney and this gave
notice to the HOLO. Query, should not the authority of the agent be deter-
mined before the decision is made which by implication attributes the knowledge
of the agent to the principal?
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title indicates, was paid through the HOLC on a fee basis,s9 and
at no time was there a salary for such service. Also, all of the
officials of the HOLC who were empowered to pass on the loan
were on a salary basis. Further, "The Manual of Rules and Regu-
lations of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation" prescribed the
duties of the fee attorney, and those included only the examination
of titles and clearances of defects, preparation of title reports and
closing of loans.8 6 In other words, the fee attorney was charged
with the sole duty of closing loans and certifying that the HOLC
was obtaining a valid first lien on the property in question. It
seems that the fee attorney was an agent with limited authority
and that that authority did not extend to the matter of the lien
holder making a collateral agreement with the home owner requir-
ing any additional payments. A third party who deals with an
agent with limited authority is bound to ascertain the extent of
such authority.8 7  Even though "the principal is chargeable with
notice of all the material facts that come to the knowledge of his
agent in a transaction in which the agent is acting for the prin-
cipal," 8 8 however, "an agent may be given a very limited and
special power over the subject-matter, and the fact in question may
have no bearing upon the exercise of that power. In that case the
knowledge of the agent would not be imputed to the principal." 9
Where there was no disclosure to any official of the HOLC of the
collateral agreement, and the collateral agreement was made when
or after the bond consent was given but before the release in full
was given, the same problem arises as in the preceding cases.
Again, if the binding option is still operative, the collateral agree-
ment would not be binding, as the offeror was not privileged to
change his offer." On the other hand, if the binding option had
expired, then there arises the question as to the effect on the HOLC
of this "secret" agreement. In reference to such agreements some
courts have termed them "secret," but this does not seem to be
89 See Manual of Rules and Regulations c. 6, § 1. d(2). "Fee Attorneys are
,not employees of this Corporation and shall be paid on a fee basis."
80 See Manual of Rules and Regulations e. 3, § 13, and c. 6, § 1.d(1)(2) (3).
87 See HUFFCUT, AGENCY § 104; MECHEM, AGENCY § 238; Gore v. Canada
Life Ins. Co., 119 Mich. 136, 77 NT. W. 650 (1898).
88 HUFFCUT, AGENCY § 141; MECnES, AGENCY § 342; Devall v. Burbridge,
4 W. & S. 305 (Pa. 1842).
8 HWUFcUT, AGENCY 190; MECHEM, AGENCY § 488; Trentor v. Pothen, 46
Mim. 298, 49 N. W. 129(1891).
90 XSON, CONTACTS 55, n, 2,
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important.91 The Kansas court in Cook v. Donner"2 said that "the
matter of secrecy of the agreement is not very important," since
the making of the agreement is forbidden by the rules of the BOLC.
It seems that the matter of "secrecy" in such a case should be dis-
posed of on the ground that the lien holder could not make a con-
tract with the HOLC and then abrogate part of it by the maldng
of a collateral agreement with the third party beneficiary of such
contract, to the possible injury of both the HOLC and this third
party beneficiary.93 In accepting the bonds of the HOLC and in
giving a full release to the home owner, the lien holder led the
HOLC to believe that the original offer was still operative. Under
contract law there is no basis for allowing the lien holder to escape
his contractual duties.
Another problem arises in the case where the lien holder had
surrendered to the home owner part of the lien notes and accepted
in payment of them the unsecured note of the home owner. Later
the lien holder signed the bond consent for the unpaid balance of
the lien debt, and for such unpaid balance of the lien debt, received
the bonds of the HOLC, giving to the homie owner a full release.
In such a case the lien holder performed the contract in accordance
with the terms of the offer, and the home owner received a full
release of the lien. The letter of the contract was performed but
the spirit was violated. It would be contended that the unsecured
notes were no part of the transaction between the lien holder and
the HOLC. In such a case, the question that instantly arises is:
why should a lien holder surrender notes secured by a lien on real
estate and in their place accept unsecured notes of the home owner,
who at that time was in default of the payments of the lien indebt-
edness? Ordinarily do individuals exchange secured notes for un-
secured notes? Where such a transaction occurred, and, then
shortly afterwards, the lien holder gave a bond consent to the
HOLC, it would seem that such exchange of notes was merely a
part of a general scheme to allow the lien holder to obtain all pos-
sible from the HOLC and then to hold the home owner liable for
the balance of the original indebtedness. A presumption in favor
of such inference should be raised. In such a case it would seem
that public policy would prevent the enforcement of such a con-
tract.
91 See Jessewich v. Abbene, Stager v. Junker, both supra n. 7.
92 145 Kan. 674, 680, 66 P. (2d) 587, 591 (1937).
93 See Anderson v. Horst, 200 AtI. 721, 723 (Pa, Super. 1938).
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"Public policy is a variable test", yet there are situations
where it is properly applicable. This is true with respect to all of
these collateral agreements that cannot be determined on the prin-
ciples of contract law. The court should deny enforcement of such
a contract calculated and intended to defeat the very purpose of
the act. The exacting of the collateral agreement on the part of
the lien holder denoted bad faith towards the lending agency."
It is an agreement in fraud of the law and thwarts the govern-
ment in carrying out the benefits intended by the act. If any part
of the agreement is upheld, it gives an advantage to a party not
directly intended to be benefited and to the detriment of the in-
tended beneficiary of the act and possibly to the detriment of the
people of the United States who own the HOLC." 9  Such contracts
should not be tolerated in any respect. Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"Contracts that obviously and directly tend in a marked
degree to bring about results that the law seeks to prevent
cannot be made the ground of a successful suit."'9 T
It has been contended by some lien holders that it is not equi-
table to make the lien holder subject to rules and regulations not
set forth in the act, but the Mfichigan court said: "While the rules
94 Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R. I. 3, 6, 19 Atl. 712, 713 (1890).
9r See Stager v. Junker, 14 N. J. Misc. 913, 188 Ati. 440 (1936). In
Richardson v. Crandall, 48 N. Y. 348, 362 (1872), the court said: "In all
cases where contracts are claimed to be void as against public policy it matters
not that any particular contract is free from any taint of actual fraud, oppres-
sion or corruption.... The vice is in the very nature of the contract, and it is
condemned as belonging to a class which the law will not tolerate."
96 Presiding Judge Keller in Anderson v. Horst, 200 Atl. 721, 722 (Pa.
Super. 1938) said: Iit was not intended for the relief of mortgagees, but
they could secure its benefits if they were willing to reduce their claims and
accept in settlement HOLC bonds for the reduced amount. The advantage to
them was the receipt of readily marketable bonds-for a less amount, it is
true-in place of foreclosing their mortgages and buying in real estate for
which there was no available market under the depressed conditions prevailing.
Nor was it the intention of Congress that the Corporation should merely be
substituted for the mortgagee and should foreclose and buy in the mortgage
and dispossess the home owner. The purpose and intent was to relieve pressing
conditions and give the home owner a chance to work out his salvation. This
could not be accomplished if following the refunding, and as a condition for
the mortgagee's consent to it, the home owner should be burdened by a re-
assumption of the debt, or part of it, which had been settled and released.
The natural and probable effect of such an assumption would be to lessen the
ability of the home owner to make his amortization payments and thus imperil
the plan which Congress had devised for his relief, and load up the Corporation
with foreclosed real estate, to the injury of the Government and its taxpayers;
and a levy upon and sale of the home owner's furniture and personal effects,
which would destroy the character of the property as a home, would have
the same effect."
97 Sage v. Hampe, 235 U. S. 99, 105, 35 S. Ct. 94, 59 L Ed. 147 (1914).
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and regulations are not widely publicized by the various govern-
mental agencies, nevertheless the law does provide for such rules
and regulations. '"98 The lien holder acknowledged in the bond
consent that he "had considered the method of refunding the mort-
gage as provided in the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as passed
by Congress and approved by the President," and by such admis-
sion he must have known the board might pass rules and regula-
tions concerning such cases. 9 If the lien holder took no steps to
ascertain whether rules and regulations had been passed, it seems
he is estopped to plead his own negligence. The United States
Supreme Court said: "The resolution adopted by the Board of
Directors sets forth the nature of the ordinary charges that 'are
authorized and required,' and the power of Congress to provide
for such action by the Board is not open to question. '" 100
In many cases the home owner will not plead the proper de-
fense in a suit %vhere the lien holder is trying to enforce the col-
lateral agreement, and of course the court cannot plead the proper
defense for him. Nor can the courts take judicial notice of de-
fenses not pleaded by the parties. But the court may take judicial
notice of public policy. Where such illegality exists as in most of
these cases, and such illegality contravenes the act itself, the courts
should take judicial notice of the public policy of the act.1"'
In view of the purpose of the act and the needs of the home
owner that the act attempted to remedy, it follows that the home
owner is entitled to the benefit of the contract made between the
HOLC and the lien holder, from the technical reasoning of con-
tract law as well as from the standpoint of public policy. When
the HOLC gave the lien holder its bonds in exchange for the
promise of the lien holder as set forth in the bond consent, and the
lien holder gave the home owner a full release, such contract was
made for the benefit of both the HOLC and the home owner. If
this contract is strictly enforced, the home owner will be more
able to meet his payments as they come due, and the HOLC will
be more likely to get its advances. '102 Therefore, these contracts
98 Meek v. Wilson, 283 Mich. 679, 278 N. W. 731, 735 (1938).
s9 See Mortgagee's Consent to Take Bonds, supra n. 27.
LOO Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, 9, 58 S. Ct. 468, 82 L. Ed. 607 (1937).
101 See Meek v. Wilson, 283 Mich. 679, 278 N. W. 731 (1938).
102 In Chaves County Building & Loan Ass'n v. Hodges, 40 N. M. 326, 59
P. (2d) 671, 672 (1936), the court said: "It has been held that the courts
should take judicial notice of the fact that the Home Owners' Loan Corpora-
tion is strictly a relief agency, organized to aid distressed home owners. The
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should be interpreted strictly, so that the lien holder will not
enjoy the benefits of the contract made with the HOLC and then
enjoy further privileges at the expense of both the home owner
and the HOLC. To hold otherwise would be to contravene the
purpose of the act itself, and to make it an act for the benefit of
the lien holder, which was never intended by Congress.'"3
reduction in the amount of the home owner's debt (which, of course, can be
accomplished only with the consent of his creditor) is the most effective aid,
in most instances, which can be rendered to him. Merely to put off the evil
day of foreclosure would fail to carry out the purposes of the act. If the
debt is more than 80 per cent. of the value of the home, and the creditor
refuses to discount his claim, the law affords no remedy. However, the creditor
generally chooses to exchange his lien for a smaller sum in bonds. The Home
Owners' Loan Corporation is interested in the reduction of the indebtedness
of the home owner who procures a loan."
103 Justice Butzel in Meek v. Wilson, 283 Mich. 679, 278 N. W. 731, 734
(1938) said: "Its purpose was not to assist holders of liens against the
property, but to enable owners of'homes to save their homes from foreclosure
by advancing on first mortgages, sums to be used to pay off liens and to
lighten the burdens of the home owners. Any benefit that might accrue to
lienholders would be incidental. The HOLC, in refinancing a home owner's
obligations, sought to readjust them in accordance with his ability to make
payments. The salutary effect of such a readjustment would be nullified if
a lienholder were permitted, without regulation, to defeat the purpose of
the Home Owners' Loan Act. An agreement exacted by a lienholder which
tends to counteract the relief of the home owner sought by the act is con-
trary to the purpose of the act and to the regulations adopted thereunder."
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